The nature of international trade has changed significantly since the early 1990s: the liberalisation of cross-border transactions, advances in information and communication technology, reductions in transport costs, and innovations in logistics have given firms greater incentives to break up the production process and locate its various stages across many countries. As a result, global supply chains have become very common, accounting for around a half of global trade in 2020 (World Bank 2020).

The prevalence of global value chains has been underpinned by the well-functioning international trade rule enshrined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the WTO, as well as regional agreements. However, geopolitical tensions and disruptions to global value chains – ranging from cyber-threats, the US-China trade war (Fajgelbaum et al. 2022), and the Russian invasion of Ukraine to systemic issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis – have led policymakers to re-evaluate their approach to globalisation. Many countries are considering ‘friend-shoring’ – trading primarily with countries sharing similar values (such as democratic institutions or maintaining peace) – as a way of minimising exposure to weaponisation of trade and securing access to critical inputs, particularly those required for green transition (Arjona et al. 2023, Attinasi et al. 2023).

In contrast to optimisation under free trade, friend-shoring – by imposing constraints – is likely to be less efficient. But how high is the price that needs to be paid for the alleged insurance benefits brought about by friend-shoring? To shed some light on this question, this chapter assesses the economic costs of friend-shoring, with a focus on broadly defined emerging Europe and European neighbourhood economies. We make three main points. First, we show that, in the medium run, friend-shoring is bad for most economies and generally leads to real output losses globally. Second, only countries that manage to remain non-aligned may see real output gains, but these gains are much smaller than the losses incurred by other countries and not guaranteed. Third, economic costs of friend-shoring are higher than the economic costs of sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5,000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.

Wall Street Journal: Sanctions Against Russia Could Be Better, These Harvard Economists Say

Video summary: How can sanctions against Russia be more effective?

Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.

E-Letter in Science: How to weaken Russian oil and gas strength

The war in Ukraine has been waging for a month now, not only causing human suffering on a massive scale, but also sending economic tremors that are felt far beyond the country’s borders. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s economy has been pulled between its strong historical ties with the Russian economy and the opportunities in forging new ties with the European Union (EU). With the help of Metroverse, an online tool for analyzing the local economies of over a thousand cities worldwide, and of the data that power this tool, we analyze the evolving economic relations between Ukraine, Russia and the West and weigh the consequences of their disruption.

Explore: The Economic Geography of the War in Ukraine 

Related reading:
Media Release
Bloomberg Opinion: Markets Need to Lose the ‘Peace in Our Time’ Reflex

We analyze Ukraine's opportunities to participate in European value chains, using traditional gravity models, combined with tools from Economic Complexity Analysis to study international trade (exports) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This toolbox is shown to be predictive of the growth and entry of new exports to the EU's Single Market, as well as foreign direct investments from the Single Market in Ukraine. We find that Ukraine has suffered from a decline of trade with Russia, which has led not only to a quantitative but also a qualitative deterioration in Ukrainian exports. Connecting to western European value chains is in principle possible, with several opportunities in the automotive, information technology and other sectors. However, such a shift may lead to a spatial restructuring of the Ukrainian economy and a mismatch between the geographical supply of and demand for labor.