Researchers at the Growth Lab identify problems undermining inclusive growth: collapsing state capacity and spatial exclusion
Cambridge, MA — A new report by Harvard's Growth Lab finds that South Africa's economy is performing poorly, and its society is facing the consequences of extreme unemployment and inequality. Three decades after the end of apartheid, the economy is...
It is painfully clear that South Africa is performing poorly, exacerbating problems such as inequality and exclusion. The economy’s ability to create jobs is slowing, worsening South Africa’s extreme levels of unemployment and inequality. South Africans are deeply disappointed with social progress and dislike the direction where the country seems to be heading. Despite its enviable productive capabilities, the national economy is losing international competitiveness. As the economy staggers, South Africa faces deteriorating social indicators and declining levels of public satisfaction with the status quo. After 15 years, attempts to stimulate the economy through fiscal policy and to address exclusion through social grants have failed to achieve their goals. Instead, they have sacrificed the country's investment grade, increasing the cost of capital to the whole economy, with little social progress to show for it. The underlying capabilities to achieve sustained growth by leveraging the full capability of its people, companies, assets, and knowhow remain underutilized. Three decades after the end of apartheid, the economy is defined by stagnation and exclusion, and current strategies are not achieving inclusion and empowerment in practice.
This report asks the question of why. Why is the economy growing far slower than any reasonable comparator countries? Why is exclusion so extraordinarily high, even after decades of various policies that have aimed to support socio-economic transformation? What would it take for South Africa to include more of its people, capabilities, assets, and ideas in the functioning of the economy, and why aren’t such actions being undertaken already? The Growth Lab has completed a deep diagnostic of potential causes of South Africa’s prolonged underperformance over a two-year research project. Building on the findings of nine papers and widespread collaboration with government, academics, business and NGOs, this report documents the project’s central findings. Bluntly speaking, the report finds that South Africa is not accomplishing its goals of inclusion, empowerment and transformation, and new strategies and instruments will be needed to do so. We found two broad classes of problems that undermine inclusive growth in the Rainbow Nation: collapsing state capacity and spatial exclusion.
This growth diagnostic report analyzes the economic constraints that explain the underperformance of the agriculture sector in Namibia. Section 1 starts by showing why Namibia’s agricultural challenge is unique when compared to the rest of the world. We then describe the sector’s key features, recent trajectory, and growth potential across different relevant dimensions in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide an adaptation of the growth diagnostic framework to the case of agriculture in Namibia and a detailed analysis of its economic constraints. Finally, Section 4 presents policy guidelines for addressing the challenges described in this report and prioritizing policy interventions accordingly.
Guest Blog by Charlotte Tjeriko-Katjiuanjo, LEG ’22
The growth problem I chose to look at for Namibia is a lack of a diversified sector, which has caused high unemployment and low economic growth. The country has a high and increasing public debt, limited fiscal space, fiscal consolidation, increasing unemployment with limited product space.
The course has taught me to look at the problem with a different eye, distinguishing between the actual cause of the growth problem to the symptoms of the growth. This was...
Tanzania’s manufacturing puzzles (and frustrations) seem to be a natural outcome of their policy choice. The Tanzanian economy experienced a significant acceleration over two decades, growing at a compounded annual growth rate of 6% between 1998 and 2018: Largest rates were recorded and sustained by the super commodity cycle (2005-2014). Within that growth trajectory, manufacturing’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) has lingered for 30 years below 10% – well below the 23% target established for 2025 in Tanzania’s Industrial Development Strategy (2011). As stressed by Diao et al (2021), the bulk of manufacturing value added is created by a few capital-intensive firms, whereas informal manufacturing has increased employment but without significant improvements in productivity/wages. Manufacturing exports surged in 2011 and remained steady since driven by subsector basic metals (gold & unrefined copper). If these are excluded, the curve mirrors the commodity price boom (likely a price boom rather than a volume boom). Looking only at exports conceals the fact that the bulk of the manufacturing output in Tanzania is sold in the domestic market rather than exported: exports are equivalent to less than 2% of GDP; domestic sales are seven times higher. While Food and Beverages make up for the largest share of manufacturing value employment and value-added, basic metals are the ones accounting for the vast majority of Tanzania’s exports.
The most binding constraint to investments in manufacturing in Tanzania is the availability and quality of electricity supply: Access to electricity is the lowest among peers, with large disparities between rural (22%) and urban (70%). Electrical outages are frequent and expensive for the manufacturing sector; firms even plan their production schedules and decide on plant locations based on power reliability. And yet, when we analyze the share of value-added against energy intensity at the sub-sector level, the negative relationship to be expected if electricity is indeed the constraint is there, but too fragile and noisy. Why? The strongest evidence points to the role of trade protection in compensating firms for other constraints, allowing existing manufacturers to capture large shares of domestic value-added while remaining uncompetitive in export markets. Large manufacturing subsectors of moderate to high energy intensity and more capital intensive enjoy higher tariff protection, creating a wedge that allows these industries to thrive in the domestic market. Despite joining numerous free trade agreements, Tanzania remains one of the most restrictive countries from a trade standpoint, eased by filing exceptions that shield individual products and entire domestic industries from competition. We have also found that effective taxation in Tanzania is relatively higher on labor (lower on capital, materialized through massive tax holidays granted within SEZ), skewing returns away from the country’s relative labor abundance. Failure to address the binding constraints creates a rationale for upholding protection, which reinforces biases towards capital and energy-intensive sectors. These policies go a long way in explaining the Tanzanian manufacturing puzzle.
Combining satellite data with FAO potential yields we provide a new measure of South Africa's current and potential crop farming output. We find that field crop production is twice its census estimate, contributing 1.4% of GDP rather than 0.7%, and that achieving potential could increase its contribution a further 0.5% of GDP. Estimating horticulture potential is more difficult. We find that its 0.7% contribution to GDP is massively unreported, with actual production at 2.5%. Reaching potential could increase this number a further 0.5%. The distance from current to potential output represents over 100 billion 2017 rand of additional gross income and about 350.000 thousand jobs and is unevenly distributed across the country and concentrated in four provinces: Free State, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape. Our result suggests that there is room to expand agriculture, but because the potential gains are geographically concentrated, the solutions should have a strong location dimension.
We discuss three cases of corporate-smallholder partnerships in South Africa’s former homelands, which have tried to bridge the problem of low productivity by supplying technology, technical assistance and financing along with established channels for sales and distribution. The cases are indicative of some key difficulties faced by such ventures: building trust, finding a suitable partner, successfully transferring technological to small farms, and reducing risk, particularly climate related. In order for these types of partnerships to help close the gap between South Africa’s two agricultures, solutions to these problems must be provided at greater scale. We explore mechanisms to achieve that scale, drawing lessons from South Africa’s successful franchising sector, as well as newly emerging business models and technologies from abroad.
This research compendium provides an explanation of Ethiopia’s fundamental economic challenge of slowing economic growth after an exceptional growth acceleration — a challenge that has been compounded by COVID-19, conflict, and climate change impacts. Ethiopia has experienced exceptional growth since the early 2000s but began to see a slowdown in the capacity of the economy to grow, export, and produce jobs since roughly 2015. This intensified a set of macroeconomic challenges, including high, volatile, and escalating inflation. This compendium identifies a path forward for more sustainable and inclusive growth that builds on the government’s Homegrown Economic Reform strategy. It includes growth diagnostics and economic complexity research as well as applications to unpack interacting macroeconomic distortions and inform diversification strategies. Drawing on lessons from past success in Ethiopia and new constraints, this compendium offers insights into what the Government of Ethiopia and the international community must do to unlock resilient, post-conflict economic recovery across Ethiopia.
The research across the chapters of this compendium was developed during the Growth Lab’s research project in Ethiopia from 2019 to 2022, supported through a grant by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). This research effort, which was at times conducted in close collaboration with government and non-government researchers in Ethiopia, pushed the boundaries of Growth Lab research. The project team worked to understand to intensive shocks faced by the country and enable local capability building in the context of limited government resources in a very low-income country. Given the value of this learning, this compendium not only discusses challenges and opportunities in Ethiopia in significant detail but also describes how various tools of diagnostic work and economic strategy-building were used in practice. As such, it aims to serve as a teaching resource for how economic tools can be applied to unique development contexts. The compendium reveals lessons for Ethiopian policymakers regarding the country’s development path as well as numerous lessons that the development community and development practitioners can learn from Ethiopia.
Ethiopia suffers from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange (forex).[1] The resulting lack of access to imports prevents firms from accessing imported inputs required for production. This creates a vicious cycle as exporters are constrained by this same problem, which further reduces overall supply of foreign exchange in the Ethiopian economy. The inability to reliably access foreign exchange for imports affects firm decisions on sourcing, capacity, and output. While the cost of this constraint is known to be high on the Ethiopian economy and firms are known to use a range of measures to attempt to bypass this constraint, quantitative assessments of the problem and response actions by firms are limited. It is in this context that an importer survey was conducted with the goal of informing policy decisions. A total of 202 firms with an active importing license were interviewed in March-April 2022. These firms were randomly sampled from firms registered with an importer license.
All firms interviewed reported that they were operating below capacity, often well below capacity. Foreign exchange shortages were the main reason respondent firms cited for not operating at full capacity (63% of firms reporting this as their biggest constraint). Forex shortages far surpass the second and third reasons cited for not operating at full capacity — constraints due to the conflict (13%) and COVID-19 restrictions (11%). Firms operating below capacity cited forex shortages as the main constraint, regardless of whether they imported or not in the previous year. This was the most pressing constraint reported by firms of all sizes and sectors surveyed. It was the most pressing constraint faced by exporters and by foreign-owned firms as well as non-exporters and domestic firms. Amongst the total sample of firms with a renewed importer license, more than one-third of respondent firms (37%) had not imported in FY2020-21.
Overall, 74% of firms reported experiencing challenges in accessing forex. Access to forex was reported as most challenging for manufacturing firms and smaller firms but impacted all sectors and firm sizes. The losses attributed to forex scarcity at the firm level were largest for agricultural firms, for micro-firms, and for firms that did not import at all in the previous year. In general, the larger the firm sales, the higher the likelihood that they were able import. The survey found different types of imports for different sectors. Manufacturing firms imported a large share semi-finished goods as imports as compared to agricultural firms that primarily imported finished goods. The survey results find that foreign exchange shortages and an inability to import are most severe for the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, small and micro-sized firms, and all non-exporters. However, the constraint is also the top problem facing all firm types in the survey, including exporters and foreign-owned firms.
The primary means of accessing foreign exchange where it did occur was through specialized forex accounts or ‘diaspora’ accounts. The second most common means of accessing foreign exchange was through retention accounts available to exporters. The black market featured in many responses, but questions across the survey suggest that self-reported use of the black market by survey participants is underreported versus actual usage. The ability to source foreign exchange differed significantly by firm size. Exporting firms primarily used retention account earnings, as compared to non-exporters, which relied more on forex accounts. For faster access to forex, most firms reported that they approach banks, followed by turning to the black market. Friends and family abroad also served as a source of forex for one-quarter of firm respondents, and that foreign exchange was often used immediately. Foreign exchange access from banks is nevertheless a major pain point for firms. Most firms (55%) requested forex from a bank in the past year. On average, fulfilled forex requests took three months to be processed when they were fulfilled, but many firms reported that they have an unfulfilled request that has been in the system for more than a year. These firms are especially likely to report foreign exchange access as their top challenge.
The survey finds that individual firms do not tend to use both official and black-market foreign exchange sources but rather tend to access all their forex at the (lower) official rate or all at the (higher) black-market. Large firms import most of their products at the official rate. By contrast, most small and micro firms import through other means. Manufacturing firms are also more likely to import all their production through other means and outside of the banking system. Non-exporting firms tended to import through other means than the official rate and outside of the banking system at a higher prevalence than exporting firms. The survey gleaned new insights on the implicit exchange rate that firms face as they navigate official and black-market channels of foreign exchange access. The survey does not allow for a precise estimate of the transaction-weighted exchange rate facing the economy but finds firm-level estimates align with previous macro-level estimates. The implicit exchange rate was higher for non-exporting firms, which show a greater willingness to pay a higher exchange rate to access imports. This signals the importance of the retention account for exporters to guarantee an import price closer to the official exchange rate.
When asked about the maximum rate firms would pay to guarantee access to forex, some groups of firms were willing to pay higher amounts, including all non-exporters, firms that imported in the past year, and those that declared forex access a challenge. When compared to the implied rate they paid in the past year, many firms are willing to pay more than the implied rate to guarantee access to forex. Firm perspectives on policy changes to the exchange rate underscored challenges faced by policymakers. Current policy has been one of a crawling peg, with changes within the last several years to increase the rate of devaluation. The survey asked respondents about their support for faster devaluation, for a one-off movement to unify the official rate with the black-market rate, or about alternative exchange rate systems such as a floating exchange rate. Most respondents (71%) opposed maintaining the current regime, yet no option received majority support. Most firms appear to want both a stronger exchange rate and easier access to foreign exchange despite a tradeoff between these two priorities. The largest share of support for policy change was to adjust the exchange rate such that the official rate matches the black-market rate.
South Africa’s labor market exhibits a unique equilibrium with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world and yet a low level of informal employment. The unemployment rate has remained high and persistent over recent decades, in spite of the formal demise of the apartheid regime and subsequent transition to democracy in 1994. This paper uses a matching model of the labor market to argue that spatial considerations combined with low productivity of informal work may be responsible for such an outcome. Spatial dispersion inherited from the apartheid regime thins the labor market, creating exclusion and perpetuating spatial segregation. In most developing countries, the result would be higher employment in informal or own account employment. However, with low productivity in the informal sector, the high rate of exclusion shows itself in higher unemployment rates instead. Transportation costs and housing deregulation may become key factors in improving the working of the labor market in South Africa especially if it is not possible to raise informal productivity.
