Jamal Haidar

2017
Sanctions and Export Deflection: Evidence from Iran
Haidar, J.I., 2017. Sanctions and Export Deflection: Evidence from Iran. Economic Policy , 32 (90) , pp. 319–355. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Do export sanctions cause export deflection? Data on Iranian non-oil exporters between January 2006 and June 2011 shows that two-thirds of these exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after sanctions were imposed in 2008, and that at this time aggregate exports actually increased. Exporting firms reduced prices and increased quantities when exporting to a new destination, however, and suffered welfare losses as a result.
economic_policy_haider_april_2017.pdf
Haidar, J.I., 2017. Sanctions and Export Deflection: Evidence from Iran.Abstract

Do export sanctions cause export deflection? Data on Iranian non-oil exporters between January 2006 and June 2011 shows that two-thirds of these exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after sanctions were imposed in 2008, and that at this time aggregate exports actually increased. Exporting firms reduced prices and increased quantities when exporting to a new destination, however, and suffered welfare losses as a result.

working-paper-80.pdf
2016
Diwan, I. & Haidar, J.I., 2016. Do Political Connections Reduce Job Creation? Evidence from Lebanon.Abstract
Using firm-level census data, we determine how politically-connected firms (PCFs) reduce job creation in Lebanon. After observing that large firms account for the bulk of net job creation, we find that PCFs are larger and create more jobs, but are also less productive, than non-PCFs in their sectors. On a net basis, at the sector-level, each additional PCF reduces jobs created by 7.2% and jobs created by non-PCFs by 11.3%. These findings support the notion that politically-connected firms are used for clientelistic purposes in Lebanon, exchanging privileges for jobs that benefit their patrons’ supporters.
diwan-haidar-rfwp70.pdf